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Recent Cases
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SUPPORT DENIED WIFE.AFTER
HUSBAND'S EX PARTE NEVADA DIVORCE UNDER
NEW YORK STATUTE WHEN WIFE NOT
DOMICILED IN NEW YORK
Loeb v. Loeb'
Plaintiff, wife, sought in a New York state court a decree of divorce and
separation, alimony and counsel fees. She had not been domiciled in New York
during marriage but lived in Vermont. As late as August, 1953, she filed notice of
retaining residence in Vermont with the town clerk of Windham, Vermont. Her
husband had secured a Nevada ex parte divorce in 1952. In August of 1953 plaintiff
moved to New York pursuant to an agreement between herself, her ex-husband,
and/or her ex-mother-in-law. Plaintiff averred that she first formed an intent to
become a New York resident in October, 1953, more than one year after the Nevada
divorce. Plaintiff had instituted a suit in Vermont and the decision was still pending
at the time she brought her suit in New York for the same relief. The Vermont
supreme court later denied plaintiff relief.2 The New York supreme court entered
judgment for the defendant.3 The supreme court, appellate division, affirmed but
granted plaintiff leave to appeal. 4 The New York court of appeals ruled that plain-
tiff's case did not place her within the New York Civil Practice Act so as to be
awarded maintenance under section 1170-b.5 The apparent rule was that convenience
and a jurisdiction in which a divorcee will enjoy greater rights than she might in
another state is not enough to place her within the ambit of section 1170-b if her
matrimonial domicile is not New York.
The area of domestic relations in conflict of laws is fraught with complexities.
In recent years it has undergone many changes and the courts of the land have
made significant contributions thereto, casting aside the federal concepts of the
1. 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36, 176 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1958).
2. Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d 518 (1955).
3. Loeb v. Loeb, 3 Misc. 2d 622, 155 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
4. Loeb v. Loeb, 3 App. Div. 2d 834, 163 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1957).
5. 6A GILBERT-BLISS, CIVM PRACTICE OF NEw YORK 74 (1944, Supp. 1958).
In an action for divorce, separation or annulment ... where the court
refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that a
divorce . . . declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been granted
to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person ... was
not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action such
judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife.
(366)
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martial relationship and ch.'rting a course which does not offend the dignity of
logic. The statute here under consideration offered the state of New York an
opportunity to advance in this field. Cases interpreting this statute show the New
York courts did not take full advantage of this opportunity.
The doctrine of divisible divorce is now well established by the case of Estin v.
Estin.6 In this case the Supreme Court of the United States decided that a proper
ex parte divorce decree must be given full faith and credit as to the termination of
the termination of the marial status of husband and wife, but affirmed the power
of the state of New York to grant support to Mrs. Estin pursuant to a separation
order, which had support provisions, obtained prior to the Nevada ex parte divorce
gained by Mr. Estin. As a result, the divorce was held divisible into the portion
representing marial status and that involving economic status.
However, protection of the rule in the Estin case has been denied to wives who
participated in foreign divorce proceedings after a separation judgment in their
- favor had been awarded by a New York court.7
Before rule 1170-b was enacted there was no procedure enabling a wife to
protect her support rights unless prior to the foreign divorce she had obtained
alimony in a separate suit in the state of New York. Thus in 1953 the Law Revision
Commission directed its attention to overcoming this procedural bar and recom-
mended section 1170-b.8
The Vanderbilt9 case upheld the constitutionality and validity of section 1170-b
and its extension of the divisible divorce concept to situations where the divorced
wife did not have a prior support decree. The New York court of appeals stated:
"There is nothing in the statute's language to suggest that it was intended to apply
only to marriages where the parties had lived together in this State as their matri-
monial domicile."' 0 But the court further recognized that when the husband
abandoned his wife she set up domicile in New York before the Nevada judgment
was entered and stated: "We need not decide whether she would have the same
right to come into New York, even after a foreign-State divorce, to take advantage
of section 1170-b."1
6. 334 U.S. 541 (1948), affirming 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947).
7. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 NXE.2d 748 (1951), wherein husband and wife
were separated by New York decree in favor of wife, husband later filed for divorce
in foreign state and wife appeared to contest personally and with counsel; Polk v.
Polk, 277 App. Div. 885, 98 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1950); Ehrenpreis v. Ehrenpreis, 106 N.Y.S.2d
568 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Glennan v. Glennan, 97 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Berkowitz
v. Berkowitz, 92 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Goodman v. Goodman, 82 N.Y.S.2d 318
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
8. NEw YoRx LAW REVIsIoN ComMIssIoN, REPORT FOR 1953, 463-80; Weintraub v.
Weintraub, 302 N.Y. 104, 96 N.E.2d 724 (1951); Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N.Y. 561, 100
N.E. 408 (1912); Erkenbrach v. Erkenbrach, 96 N.Y. 456 (1884); Ramsden v. Ramsden,
91 N.Y. 281 (1883).
9. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), affirming 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135
N.E2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
10. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 349, 135 N.E.2d 553, 556, 153 N.Y.S.2d
1, 6 (1956).
11. Id. at 351, 135 N.E.2d at 558, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
1959]
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Cases interpreting section 1170-b show the conservative attitude of the New
York courts. In Methfessel v. MethfesseJ12 the supreme court of New York, King%
County, held that when the husband had secured an ex parte divorce several month.,
before the effective date of section 1170-b the act could not be applied retroactively
to protest the wife. In Axelrod v. Axelrod' 3 the supreme court of New York, Kings
County, held, after a study of the section, that it was a condition precedent to the
exercise of discretion in the wife's favor under the proviso "as justice may require"
that plaintiff establish proof "that but for the foreign decree she would be entitled to
a judgment of separation and would not be barred therefrom by any proof in the
record."'1 4 The wife was denied maintenance as she bad committed an act of
violence 'upon her husband. In Edell v. Edell' the husband had instituted an action
for divorce and the wife counterclaimed for separation and was awarded alimony
and counsel fees. The husband went to Florida and moved to discontinue the New
York action. The motion was dismissed and later the husband was enjoined from
prosecuting a divorce action in Florida while this action was pending. Therafter he
procured his Florida divorce decree. The supreme court of New York, Monroe
County, would not allow the husband to use this out-of-state divorce as a ground
to terminate the New York action. The court reasoned that if the husband were
allowed to terminate this action by use of the Florida decree and the wife could not
prove the divorce a fraua upon the Florida court, it would bar her claim for alimony
previously granted to her and section 1170-b would not apply as it is not retroactive
in nature. However, Canty v. Canty'0 held under section 1170-b that a wife should
have alimony and counsel fee prior to a judgment when her husband claimed a
foreign divorce.
The majority decision announced by Judge Froessel in the case under considera-
tion looked behind the Civil Practice Act legislation and found the intent was to
protect New York wives and afford them a remedy as to their property rights which
might be endangered by ex parte divorces. The court reasoned that section 1170-b
was not intended to afford a haven for unfortunate divorcees from states which
:;ranted them no support remedies. The court commented that living in New York
was not the result of an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant but only
"ecause the ex-mother-in-law was an exceedingly kind woman. The court also
mentioned that plaintiff was pursuing her martial rights in the courts of Vermont,
and concluded that plaintiff in no way could be considered a New York wife
entitling her to relief under section 1170-b.
A very strong dissenting opinion written by Judge Desmond points out that in
:he aforementioned Vanderbilt decision the New York court did not determine
"w:hether section 1170-b was available to a woman who came to New York to live
after a foreign decree. He further points out that the court did not at this time have
12. 124 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
13. 2 Misc. 2d 79, 150 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
14. Id. at 81, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
15. 6 MIisc. 2d 631, 159 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
16. 123 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
[Vol. 24
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to decide whether under "any and every possible circumstance the remedy can be
demanded by divorced wife who for her own reasons selects New York as a
forum." 17 He discloses the real issue to be whether New York had "sufficient con-
tacs" with the marriage to permit jurisdiction of this suit. This question he answers
in the affirmative, interpreting her moving to New York as a result of agreement and
,tt the request of the husband and not as a result of shopping for an advantageous
jurisdiction.
It is this author's contention that the logical approach is taken by the dissent.
Here is a woman who obviously moved to New York because of an agreement with
her ex-husband or as a result of the economic crisis which he forced upon her.
Prior to her marriage she was a resident of New York. He had assets within the
state. The moral and social equities rested solely with her. The New York act was
passed with the express purpose of giving a remedy to a woman who had sufficient
relation to the state of New York to merit the aid. And certainly the Commission had
in mind keeping a dependent woman off the relief doles of the state.
The forward progressive legislation of Civil Practice Act, section 1170-b, with all
of its conceivable positive social ramifications has been narrowed and withered by
this decision. But it may well serve as a guidepost to legislative bodies of other
states considering similar legislation to spelling out in more comprehensive terms
that the relationship to or contact with the state need not be one so unimaginative as





Defendants, husband and wife, gave plaintiff a five year lease containing an
option to purchase the leased premises at any time within the five year period
upon the payment of the sum of $1,000.00. Before the lease expired, plaintiff had
expressed to defendants his intention to exercise his option to purchase unless
defendants renewed the lease on the same terms. Both defendants then repudiated
the agreement. Thereafter the purchase price was tendered to defendant-husband
two days before the option terminated, but he refused to accept it on the ground
that the property was his wife's. At that time an arrangement was made for the
parties to meet later that day. The plaintiff was present at the agreed time and
place but neither of the defendants appeared. A written demand, containing a notice
of acceptance of the option was then given to the city marshal who made a diligent
but unsuccessful effort to find the defendants before the lease and option expired.
17. 4 N.Y.2d at 552. 152 N.E.2d at 41, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97.
1. 312 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1958).
1959]
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The trial court, in an action by plaintiff for specific performance of his option
to purchase, found that plaintiff had duly exercised his option, ordered the plaintiff
to deposit the purchase money in court, and ordered the defendants to execute a
proper deed of conveyance to the plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held: (a) that where a party to a contract
has shown that he will not perform his promise, the fulfillment of a condition
precedent to that promise is excused; and therefore (b) that it was unnecessary to
examine the issue of whether defendant-husband was the agent of his wife to
accept tender of performance.
Plaintiff gave as consideration for this lease and option his promise to take the
lease and assume obligations thereunder. If this promise was primarily given to
secure the privilege of purchasing the land at any time within five years, upon
payment of $1,000.00, this option could be properly interpreted as a conditional
contract to sell. Thus treated, the defendants' repudiation of the agreement would
excuse timely ,performance of the condition, i.e. tender of the purchase price,2 and
there could be little doubt as to the soundness of this decision. However, if plain-
tiff's promise was given primarily for the use of the premises and only incidentally
for the right to purchase, then it would appear that the option was an irrevocable
offer to sell3 which would require timely acceptance, and defendants' prior repudia-
tion would not excuse it. This analysis would -require consideration of defendant-
husband's authority to arrange for a subsequent meeting and accept payment.
A search of the cases indicates that an option to purchase, embodied in a lease,
is generally treated as an irrevocable offer.4 The consideration needed to render
such an option or offer irrevocable, if not recited in the lease, has been found in
the payment of rent by the lessee or optionee.5 Interpreted as an offer, unconditional
acceptance6 must be tendered within the time specified. 7 If it is not so accepted,
the offer or option is terminated through lapse of time.8 Missouri courts have tra-
ditionally interpreted leases, containing options to purchase, in this manner.0
CHARMS B. ERICKSON
2. 5 CoRBIN, CoNacTs § 1175 (1950); 12 Am. Jun. Contracts § 330 (1938); 17
C.J.S. Contracts § 481 (1939).
3. This distinction has been noted in McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 HAIRv.
L. REV. 644, 648-49 (1914). See also 1 CoRBna, CoNTRAcT s § 262 (1950); GISrMoRE,
CONTRACTS § 31 (1947).
4. "In such contracts [options in leases] two elements exist, an offer to sell
which does not become a contract until accepted, and a contract to leave the offer
open for a specified time." Blonde v. Weber, 6 fl1. 2d 365, 374, 128 N.E.2d 883,
883 (1955). Sweezy v. Jones, 65 Iowa 272, 21 N.W. 603 (1884) (judgment lien could
not be established on land held under lease with option); Carter v. Frakes, 303
Ky. 244, 197 S.W.2d 436 (1946) (option held mere right to exercise privilege, be-
coming binding contract only when privilege exercised); Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md.
528, 45 A.2d 329 (1946) (argued that option lacked mutuality necessary for specific
performance; held option not enforced but rather contract resulting from acceptance
of continuing offer); Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 429, 73 N.E.2d 731 (1947) (an
option to buy in lease, where price was in doubt, held to be offer to sell for "fair
and reasonable" price); Cox v. McGregor, 330 Mich. 260, 47 N.W.2d 87 (1951)
5
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The defendant, after working hours, broke open the outer doors of a garage
owned by the poultry company of which he was an employee and in which he had
placed two crates of dressed chickens prior to the end of the working day. When
apprehended by the police, he was standing in the recessed space between the outer
doors, sealed by timbers, and a wire mesh screen, also braced by timbers but placed
one foot to the rear of the doors. There was no indication that he had tampered with
the wire mesh screen. The defendant was charged with and found guilty of attempted
burglary in the second degree. On appeal, held, reversed for procedural reasons,2 but
the defendant's contention that the crime had been completed was denied..
The court's decision that the crime of burglary was not completed raises two
questions:
1. With what purpose or state of mind must a person, after the commission of a
breaking, physically insert himself into a building to be guilty of burglary?
2. At what point, or across what line of demarcation, does a physical insertion
of the body become an entry?
Examining the first question, it would seem evident that the conviction of the
defendant by the trial court determined that he had the intent necessary to commit
(Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Acts did not protect option to purchase in a lease;
acts applied only to forfeitures of existing contracts); Durfee House Furnishing Co.
v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 100 Vt. 204, 136 Ati. 379 (1927) (plaintiff in ejectment
held part of city block with option to purchase entire block; before exercise, de-
fendant was given a lease for other part; held, plaintiff's contract took effect from
date of acceptance and not from date of offer).
5. Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56 S.W.2d 9 (1932); Texas
Co. v. Butler, 256 P.2d 259 (Ore. 1953).
6. Rice v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 256 Ala. 565, 56 So. 2d 647 (1952); Hafemann v.
Korinek, 266 Wis. 450, 63 N.W.2d 835 (1954).
7. Mason v. Payne, 47 Mo. 517 (1871); Kottler v. Martin, 241 N.C. 369, 85
S.E.2d 314 (1955).
8. Lux v. Lewis, 213 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1948).
9. Options contained in leases were treated as offers or continuing offers to
sell in the following cases: Chapman v. Breeze, 355 Mo. 873, 198 S.W.2d 717 (1946);
Tebeau v. Ridge, 261 Mo. 547, 170 S.W. 871 (1914); Elliott v. Delaney, 217 Mo. 14,
116 S.W. 494 (1909); Warren v. Castello, 109 Mo. 338, 19 S.W. 29 (1892); Mason v.
Payne, 47 Mo. 517 (1871); cf. Suhre v. Busch, 343 Mo. 170, 120 S.W.2d 47 (1938)
(option to repurchase stocks held to be irrevocable offer). See also Cummins v.
Dixon, 265 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1954).
1. 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958).
2. The trial court refused permission to defendant to show interest and animus
of prosecuting witness who was defendant's employer.
3. If the crime had been completed the defendant would thus come under
§ 556.160, RSMo 1949: "No person shall be convicted of an assault with an intent to
commit a crime, or of any other attempt to commit any offense, when it shall appear
that the crime intended or the offense attempted was perpetrated by such person at
the time of such assault or in pursuance of such attempt."
1959]
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burglary. But the court in the principal case ruled that the defendant had not
committed burglary, and based its conclusion in part on State v. McCaNs:
4
In such cases the entry may be said to be made with the intent rather to
procure admission into the dwelling house, than to commit a felony, which
we have seen is an indispensable constituent of the crime of burglary.
However, it is the common law rule, that a burglary is committed if the hand
or any part of the body is inserted into a building with the ultimate intent to commit
a felony, although the immediate intent may be to make an opening for the body.0
The court in essence approved this definition.- Therefore, the court's decision was
not based upon any question of Pigque's intent as the quotation may lead one to
believe, but rather it decided that he had made no physical entry within the building.
This raises the second question. As pointed out above, the court stated that an
entry sufficient to commit burglary is an insertion of any part of the body within the
building. It would seem obvious that the defendant had effected an entry when he
was apprehended in the recessed space between the outer doors and the wire mesh
screen of the garage. But the court went on to quote State v. McCall:
To constitute burglary, an entry must be made into the house with the
hand, foot, or an instrument with which it is intended to commit a felony.
In the present case there was . . . no entry beyond the sash window. The
threshold of the window had not been passed, so as to . . . consummate a
felonious intention.8
The court's reasoning that the defendant had made no entry followed the
reasoning of the McCall case. The wire mesh screen was the line of demarcation
for being within the building and the defendant, by failing to pass through this
screen, did not enter the building. Hence, the theory of entry is narrowed in respect
that any insertion of the body is not within the building until the final or supreme
barrier, which is designed to hinder breakings and physical insertions through the
roof, floor or walls and which is not distantly removed from them, is broken.
The Missouri statute9 which would have forced a reversal if the supreme court
had decided that the burglary was completed can be found verbatim in the Missouri
statutes of 1835.10 It was a clarification and restatement of the common law of
England" based upon two principles:
4. 4 Ala. 643 (1843). In this case defendant was apprehended after he had
breached an outside shutter protecting a window of a dwelling but before he bad
tampered with the window.
5. 310 S.W.2d at 947.
6. Commonwealth v. Glover, 111 Mass. 395 (1873); see Fisher v. State, 43 Ala.
17 (1869).
7. 310 S.W.2d at 945.
8. Id. at 947.
9. See statute quoted note 3 supra.
10. § 2, at 212, RSMo 1835.
11. See Queen v. Nicholls, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 182 (Assize 1847); Rex v. Harm-
wood, 1 East, P.C. 411 (Assize 1787).
[Vol. 24
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1. An attempt is a separate offense with the element distinguishing it from the
completed crime being the failure to consummate it.12
2. Conviction of a misdemeanor is forbidden where the offense charged is a
felony.':'
The effect of the first principle, as seen in the statute, is that if the crime is
completed, one of the elements necessary to find the accused guilty of the commis-
sion of an attempt would be lacking. This reasoning may still be sound in other
states,1 4 but Missouri authorizes a conviction for any lesser offense included in the
crime charged.' 5 Also Missouri courts have determined that an attempt is a lesser
included crime of the crime charged,1' and therefore the statute is no longer
supported by its original reasoning. This fact has been aptly pointed out in two cases
of the Missouri supreme court.1 7
The second principle, as it applied to attempt, was important because at the time
of the origin of the statute an attempt was a misdemeanor at common law in
England. 1 8 Therefore when an attempt was charged, if the evidence showed the
crime was completed, the attempt merged into the felony. However, in Missouri
attempts are not classified as misdemeanors but their classification depends upon the
punishment of the crime intended. 1 9 Hence this principle would not apply to
attempts.
There seems to be little need to retain the statute except that it prevents a person
from receiving a lighter punishment than he deserves.2 0 It could be a liability to the
administration of justice as observed by Lord Denman, C.J., remarking on the
doctrine of merger:
The felony may be pretended to extinguish the misdemeanor, and then
may be shown to be but a false pretence: and entire impunity has sometimes
been obtained by varying the description of the offense according to the
prisoner's interest; he has been liberated on both charges, solely because he
was guilty upon both.21
12. Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801). See also Sayre,
Criminal Attempts, 41 HA.v. L. REV. 821 (1928), for a historical review of the doctrine
of attempts.
13. Cases cited note 11 supra.
14. See Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40
YALE L.J. 53, 73 n.66 (1930).
15. § 556.230, RSMo 1949. This statute is not in conflict with § 556.160, RSMo
1949, according to State v. Scott, 172 Mo. 536, 72 S.W. 897 (1903); State v. Lacey, 111
Mo. 513, 20 S.W. 238 (1892).
16. State v. Whitaker, 275 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. 1955); State v. Frank, 103 Mo. 120, 15
S.W. 330 (1891).
17. State v. Bell, 194 Mo. 264, 91 S.W. 898 (1905); State v. Lacey, supra note 15.
18. Rex v. Harmwood, supra note 11.
19. § 556.020, RSMo 1949, states that a felony is any offense for which the
punishment is either death or imprisonment in the penitentiary only. According to
§ 556.150, RSMo 1949, an attempt carries approximately a maximum of one-half the
punishment of the intended crime; therefore if the crime attempted would be a
felony, the attempt of that crime would also be a felony.
20. See State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 491, 116 S.W.2d 42, 56 (1938).
21. Regina v. Button, 11 Q.B. 929, 948, 116 Eng. Rep. 720, 727 (1848).
1959]
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Except in this instance, Missouri follows the doctrine that the defendant should
not be heard to complain that he was convicted of a lesser crime than the one of
which he was guilty.22-
CONCLUSION
The definition given to a successful entry by this court may have no effect oi
subsequent cases with a similar problem, as each case could be distinguished from
this one on the basis of dissimilar facts. But it does illustrate the need for a
reconsideration of an outdated statute which does not allow a conviction for an




GIVEN TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
State v. Varsalonal
Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri for
arson in connection with burning his own insured liquor store. The state's evidence
tended to show that the fire was of incendiary orgin and the building and contents
were insured for $55,000. However the defendant was not charged under the statute
relating to defrauding an insurer2 but was tried and convicted under section 560.020,3
which reads in part:
Every person who shall willfully set fire to or bum any shop, warehouse
. . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction therefor shall
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than two
nor more than ten years.
On appeal, held, reversed on the grounds that the information was fatally defective in
that it failed to charge an offense.
The information defendant was tried under essentially follows section 560.020,4
but an information in the language of a statute does not charge an offense if the
22. State v. Hamey, 168 Mo. 167, 67 S.W. 620 (1902); State v. Gates, 130 Mo. 351,
32 S.W. 971 (1895); State v. Schieller, 130 Mo. 510, 32 S.W. 976 (1895).
1. 309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958).
2. § 560.025, RSMo 1949. This section includes burning one's own property with
intent to defraud another person or corporation. § 560.030, RSMo 1949, makes it a
crime to burn one's own insured personal property.
3. All statutory references, unless otherwise indicated, are to RSMo 1949.
4. The only material difference between the statute and the information is
hat the statute refers to a person who "willfully set fire to," while the information
charges the defendant did "unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, and maliciously set
fire to- a shop. 309 S.W.2d at 638.
[Vol. 24
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statute does not contain all the constituent elements of an offense.
5 The supreme
court decided the legislature intended section 560.020 to define a crime only when
the burning of one's own property was likely to endanger human life, or property of
another, or done with intent to injure or defraud; therefore in omitting these con-
stituent elements of the offense it became impossible to draft an effective information
in the language of the statute.
The court found the intent of the legislature by examining section 560.020 in
connection with the other "arson" sections.J These sections specifically set forth
the circumstances under which burning one's own property is a felony and the
court can find no reason why the legislature would have enumerated these circum-
stances,7 and also intend by the broad unrestricted language of section 560.020 to
make any burning of one's own property a felony regardless of whether a danger
was threatened. They conclude that section 560.020 does not set forth the necessary
elements of the offense, such as danger to human life, or property of another, or
that it was done with intent to injure or defraud, and an information in the language
of this section is fatally defective because it does not inform the defendant suffici-
ently as to the nature of the offense for which he is being tried.
The court cites State v. Greer8 in support of its conclusion that the legislature had
no intention of making section 560.020 as inclusive as it might appear. This case,
decided in 1912, held it was not a crime to burn one's own uninsured shop under the
1909 "arson" statues.9 Then is was only a crime to burn one's own property if it was a
dwelling house or a part thereof, or done with intent to defraud an insurer. When
section 560.02510 was enacted in 1929 it also became a crime to burn one's own
property with intent to injure another or damage another's property. The court
reasoned that if the legislature intended to make it a crime to burn one's own property
when there was no intent to harm the person or property of another, the change would
have been made specifically as was done in section 560.025.
The court arrived at the conclusion that section 560.020 requires more than the
willful burning of one's own shop to commit a crime. This decision means in effect
5. State v. Mitnick, 339 Mo. 127, 96 S.W.2d 43 (1936); State v. Wade, 267 Mo.
249, 183 S.W. 598 (1916); State v. Kentner, 178 Mo. 487, 77 S.W. 522 (1903).
6. §§ 560.010-.035, RSMo 1949.
7. § 560.010, RSMo 1949. This section makes it arson to burn one's own dwelling
house or part thereof. § 560.025, RSMo 1949. This section makes it a felony to
burn one's own property with intent to injure or destroy other property, or with
intent to injure or defraud another. § 560.030, RSMo 1949. This section makes it a
felony to bum one's own personal property to defraud an insurer.
8. 243 Mo. 599, 147 S.W. 968 (1912).
9. §§ 4505-13, RSMo 1909.
10. This section has to do with burning public and private property in general
and burning one's own property with intent to injure or destroy any other property,
or with intent to injure or defraud another. From the construction of this section
it is a little difficult to determine exactly what property is intended to be covered.
1959]
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that the burning must be willful and malicious,'I but it is not sufficient that tile
information charge a willful and malicious act. The specific danger threatened musL
be charged in the information to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense
for which he is tried.
The same problem of determining the intent of the legislature is not present in
interpreting section 560.010,12 although it is similar to section 560.020 in the sense that
each make it a crime to willfully burn "any" property. The intention of the legisla-
ture to protect the security of habitation, or human life, is manifested in using
the term "dwelling house"'13 and an information in the language of this section
adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the offense and in effect charges
the defendant with endangering human life. As the gist of this section is the protec-
tion of human life, a person should not be convicted under this section for burning
his own dwelling when tarecautions are taken to make sure human life cannot be
endangered.'
4
In conclusion it is clear that Missouri's "arson" statutes need revision. Several
sections, including section 560.020 are ambiguous and difficult to interpret and the
fact that section 560.020 does not contain the constituent elements of an offense should
be reason enough for a revsion. Until a revision does occur it is wise to remember
that section 560.020 does not contain all the constituent elements of an offense and an
informationin the words of this section. alone will be fatally defective.
JurIus F. WALL
ELECTIONS-PROPER IMARKING OFBALLOT-VOTING FOR
MORE CANDIDATES THAN TO BE ELECTED
Conner v. Idol]
Appellee Earle, Republican, defeated appellant Conner, Democrat, by a majority
of four votes for the office of councilman in Middlesboro, Kentucky. There were
six candidates for councilman in both the Republican and Democratic columns; the
voter could only vote for a total of six. Seven ballots were in controversy, four
falling into the same category. On the four ballots there was an X in the
11. BLAcK, LAw DIcTioNMRY (4th ed. 1951). Any act done willfully and purposely
to the prejudice and injury of another, which is unlawful, is, as against that person
"malicious". See also People v. Mooney, 127 Cal. 336, 59 Pac. 761 (1899) for a
discussion of the use of the words "willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously"
in an information charging arson.
12. "Every person who shall willfully set fire to or burn any dwelling house or
kitchen, shop . . . or other outhouse that is a parcel thereof . . . the property of
himself or of another shall be adjudged guilty of arson .... "
13. § 560.015, RSMo 1949. "Every house, prison, jail or other edifice, which shall
have been usually occupied by persons lodging therein, shall be deemed a dwelling
house ...."
14. Reading section 560.010, supra note 11,. literally, it would appear the same
result could be reached as was reached in the principal case, i.e., that the section
does not contain the constituent elements of an offense because it omits the specific
danger threatened.
1. 307 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. 1957). Cammack, J., dissented.
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Republican circle at the top of the ballot Also on these ballots there was an X
after the name of Conner and an X after either two or three Republican candidates'
names. None of these were after Earle's name, nor had the voter marked a total of
six candidates on any ballot. The trial court held that the ballots were spoiled and
that no votes could be counted for any of the council candidates. On appeal, this
decision was affirmed. The court stated that the X mark in the Republican circle
constituted a vote for each Republican candidate for councilman,2 and that when the
voter crossed to the Democratic ticket and put an X after the name of Conner, this
constituted voting for seven candidates when he could vote for only six.
The Kentucky court pointed out that the Kentucky statute provides that an X
under the party emblem is a vote for all the candidates on that ticket; the vote for
an individual may be cancelled, however, by voting for the opposing candidate.3
The problem was to determine who the voter voted against. Obviously he intended
to vote against someone, but there was no indicatioin as to whom.
The Kentucky court recognized that the voter probably intended to abandon
his "straight vote" as to the councilmen's race. 4 But the court thought so counting
the ballot would be contrary to the statute and would create endless problems in
determining the intent of the voter of each ballot. If the voter had "scratched" one of
the Republican's names, it would permit the ballot to be counted for the five
remaining Republicans, and appellant Conner.
Missouri provides for situations such as this by statute declaring the proper way
to "scratch" a ballot after placing an X mark under the party device, the statute
reads:
(3) Where there are two or more candidates for like office in a group,
a cross (X) mark in the square to the left of a candidate's name automatically
votes against the candidate whose name appears within the same horizontal
lines in the column under the circle in which appears the cross (X) mark,
2. In Bradley v. Cox, 271 Mo. 438, 451, 197 S.W. 88, 91 (1917) (en banc), it was
held "a party ballot, voted and cast as printed, must be held conclusively to show the
voter's intent to vote for the nominee of that party and that it must be counted...
for the party nominee therefor regardless of what name appears in the particular
space devoted to that office." B was party nominee for the office, yet Js name
appeared as the nominee. Ballots were counted for B. in Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87,
226 S.W.2d 542 (1950), where the voter put an X mark under both party devices and
also marks before names of candidates for offices on both tickets, the Kentucky court
held there was no difficulty in arriving at the voter's intention and the X marks under
the party devices would be ignored.
3. Ky. REv. STAT. § 118.280 (1956):
If a cross mark is made in the circle under the device of a party, and
a cross mark is also made in the square after the name of. .. candidates of
a different party, the vote shall be counted for the candidates so marked,
and not for the candidates for the same offices of the party so marked, but
the vote shall be counted for the other candidates under the party device.
4. Barclay, C.J., dissenting in Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 390, 412, 41 S.W. 1002,
1010 (1897) (en banc): "Both the foreign and American courts have sanctioned many
irregular markings, in obedience of the well recognized doctrine that the paramount
object of such a law is to get at and effectuate the intention of the voter."
1959]
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unless the voter indicates another candidate to be voted against by drawing a
line through such candidates's name.5
Illinois and Iowa have reached a different result on similar facts and with
statutes like the Kentucky statute. Three candidates for the office were to be elected
atc each ticket had three nominees. The ballots contained an X in the circle at the
top of ticket "A" and an X before the name of one candidate on ticket "B". The
ii.nois and Iowa courts both held that the vote could be counted for the candidate on
zic-et "B". The courts reasoned that the mark in the party circle manifested an
intent to vote for the candidates on ticket "A" except as that intent might later be
chansed. The mark before the candidate on ticket "B" showed this changed intent.
1: .,.'a a ballot marked for four candidates, the Iowa and Illinois courts ruled, one of
;,.z:ch was clearly pointed out and should receive the vote, but as to the candidates
on ticket "A" it was impossible to determine which of the three the elector intended
:o vote for, so no votes could be counted for those candidates.6
This view seems preferable. The intention of the voter is the paramount con-
s:deration.7 Unless the ballot marking violates an explicit statute, the voter's intent,
i at all possible, should be given effect.
The question of what mark the voter may use to signify his intent has arisen
many times. Many marks used. have been held to invalidate the entire ballot as
•distinguishing marks."s "A 'distinguishing mark' upon a ballot is a marking or
embellishing of the ballot which will distinguish it from others and impart knowledge
of-.person-who voted it."D The St. Louis Court of Appeals in Riefle v. Kamp] o held
that a mark in the shape of a "V" was-valid,"as were X marks with one or both of
the cross lines marked twice. The Missouri court found these not to be distinguishing
marks because upon examination of the ballot they appeared to be made without
5. ! 111.580, RSMo 1959. If X marks are placed before the names of three
candidates when only two are to be elected, the ballot is void as to that race. Riefle
v. Kamp. 241 Mo. App. 1151, 247 S.W.2d 333 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
6. Pires v. Bracken, 412 M. 416, 107 N.E2d 706 (1952); Whittam v. Zahorik, 91
_clvxa 23. 59 N.W. 57 (1894).
7. "As a basic proposition the law favors the right to vote and seeks to give
efec= to the expressed vill of the electorate." Bryan v. Barnett, 35 N.M. 207, 211,
2-.2 Pac. 611, 612 (1930).
8. **Any deliberate marking of ballot by voter that is not made in attempt to
;..-cate his choice of candidates and which is also effective as mark by which his
may be distinguished." BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). "Whether a
gnv- marking is a distinguishing mark is largely a question of fact to be determined
fr:= inspection of the original ballot. . . . Some distinguishing characteristic might
e ce pointed out on every ballot. If the mark appears, upon examination and with
retard to other ballots, to have been made without intent to identify the ballot it
sz.oud not be rejected for that reason." Riefle v. Kamp, 241 Mo. App. 1151, 1159, 247
S.W.24 333, 338 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
9. McCaRsY, ELEcTIoNs 400 n.2 (4th ed. 1897).
10. Supra note 8.
:1. Wisconsin provides that "if an elector shall mark his ballot with a cross
X). or any other marks as 1, A, V. 0, +, , - • • • it shall be deemed a
-. -. ,:ent vote." WIs. STAT. ANN. § 6.42, tit. 2 (1957).
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intent to identify the ballot.1 2 The Supreme Court of Indiana held a mark similar to
the last one invalid, as was a mark resembling a nine-point star. A mark in the form
of a reverse K was held valid, however.13 A ballot on which the voter had erased
the name of a candidate so vigorously as to cause a hole in the paper was held invalid
by the Indiana court as a distinguished. mark.' 4 The Kentucky Court of Appeals said
that a mark becomes a distinguishing mark only when it indicates a plan or scheme
by which the voter could be identified.' 5 In keeping with this principle that court has
ruled that since many voters were inept in handling the stencil, a blur instead of a
cross would be sufficient to indicate the voter's choice.' 6 The Kentucky court,
however, held a ballot invalid on which the voter had written in the candidate's
name below the place the candidate's name was printed.'7 The writing of the name
was considered a, distinguishing mark. Where the voter put an X at the right of A's
name and an "0" at the right of B's name, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held the
ballot should be counted for A, saying that the method was consistent and showed
the voter's intent.' 8
The desirable end would be to give effect to the voter's intent, without permitting
marks which could identify the voter. This end has not always been achieved as the
principal case indicates. Much lies .within- the discretion of the court. The decisions,
in some instances, rest not so much on the shape of the mark as the way in which it
was made. Infirmities, bad light, aid poor eyesight all lead to irregular and imperfect
markings. These are usually overlooked. Where the mark clearly and intentionally
differs from that prescribed, the counts apply more stringent tests for determining the
validity of the marks. The St. Louis Court of Appeals has declared: "If the voter's
intent can be gathered from his ballot, without laying down a rule which may lead
to a destruction of its secrecy, and the voter has substantially complied with the
statute, his intention should be given effect."' 9 Some courts have held that any
mark other than that prescribed by the statute invalidates the ballot.2 0
12. The lines were irregular and uneven. The court pointed 'ut "the logical
conclusion is that the voter was retracing the cross marks ... in order that it might
be more clearly seen." 241 Mo. App. at 1157, 247 S.W.2d at 337. Contra, Telles v.
Carter, 57 N.M. 704, 710, 262 P.2d 985, 989 (1953). In holding a check mark invalid,
the New Mexico court said, "If a check mark is sufficient, why not any other mark
which appeals to the individual voter."
13. Conley v. Hile, 207 Ind. 488, 193 N.E. 95 (1934).
14. Wade v.-McKibben, 226 Ind. 76, 78 N.E.2d 148 (1948). Contra, Doll v. Br'-rder,
55 W. Va. 404, 47 S.E. 293 (1904). A ballot which the voter had defaced to the extent
of cutting the names of four candidates from it with a pen knife was recognized by
the West Virginia court as good as to the remainder of txe ballot.
15. Howard v. Rowland, 261 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1953).
16. Hehman v. City of Newport, 239 Ky. 517, 39 S.W.2d 978 (1931). 2' '.llot was
also held valid where voter used wrong end of stencil, Brown v. St. Cla~r, 311 Ky.
24, 223 S.W.2d 173 (1949).
17. Kash v. Hurst, 189 Ky. 233, 224 S.W. 757 (1902).
18. In re Burke, 229 Wis. 545, 282 N.W. 598 (1938).
19. Riefle v. Kamp, 241 Mo. App. 1151, 1158, 347 S.W.2d 333, 337 (St. L. Ct. App.
1952).
20. Whittam v. Zahorik, 91 Iowa 23, 59 N.W. 57 (1894); Strosnider v. Turner, 29
Nev. 347, 90 Pac. 581 (1907); In re Vote Marks, 17 R.I. 812, 21 Atl. 962 (1890).
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Unintentional deviations will often be overlooked, particularly if they are of
minor importance. However, the voter should make a conscious effort to vote
correctly and in accordance with statutory provisions, as improper balloting is, in
truth, self-disfranchisement. "No act of the officers contributed to the violation of
the statute, but the voter through inattention, ignorance, or purposely, failed to mark
(the ballot properly) . . . and can complain of no one if he thereby lost his vote."2J
JAMFS W. RINER
EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION FOR "DAMAGE" TO
PROPERTY-CHANGE OF POSITION BY LANDOWNER
AFTER PROPOSED CONDEMNATION AND PRIOR
TO ABANDONMENT OF CONDEMNATION
Hamer v. State Highway Commissionl
Plaintiff stated in his petition that he was the owner of two hundred and
-i ty acres of land which he had started to develop into a subdivision. In doing so
he laid out, planned and located the lots, streets and sewer ways. Shortly there-
after he was told by agents of the Missouri Highway Commission that a new limited
access highway was to be constructed over a part of his land. Plaintiff examined the
plans of the Commission and changed his plan -of subdividing to make provision for
the new highway. In April, 1955 a representative of the Commission attempted to
negotiate with him for the purchase of a right-of-way over his land. Plaintiff
declined because- he needed more time to determine the proper price. Two weeks
later he was told that the Highway Commission had changed its mind that the
location of the proposed highway had been changed, and that no land of his was to
be taken. Plaintiff prayed for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court sustained
the motion dismissing the petition. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Plaintiff stated in his brief that his action was based solely on article I, section
26, of the Missouri constitution.2 The part material to this case provides, "That
private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation." The court stated that there can be no recovery for loss or expense
resulting from voluntary acts of a landowner in making changes on his premises in
expectation that condemnation proceedings will be prosecuted to judgment. A mere
plotting or planning in anticipation of a public improvement is not a taking or
damaging of the property affected. This seems to be the general rule.3
21. Judge Gantt in Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 390, 402, 41 S.W. 1002, 1007 (1897)
(en banc).
1. 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957).
2. The related provision in the federal constitution states: "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 546 (1929).
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The court said that before "damaged" was added to this Missouri constitutional
provision there were many cases without a remedy when the corpus of the property
was not taken, yet rights connected with the property were injured, but to recover
for "damaged" property the owner must show that the property itself or some right
or easement connected to it is directly and specially affected. Aside from that state-
ment the court in considering the problem does not distinguish between "taken" and
"damaged" property.
The court made a broad survey of this type of problem, citing a great deal of
authority. They said that it is not always necessary that there be an invasion or an
appropriation of some valuable property right which the landowner has, but there
must be some direct disturbance of the landowner's right and he must have sustained
special damage in excess of that by the public. The opinion further states that even
when condemnation proceedings are abandoned after they are actually started, if
there has bden no actual disturbance of the occupancy of the land, no damages can
be recovered unless there was bad faith or unreasonable delay.4
Two Missouri cases not cited by the court have some bearing on the problem. In
Kim v. Cape Girardeau & C.R.5 the defendant railroad had started condemnation
proceedings. These proceedings were abandoned after the commissioners' report. The
plaintiff asked for compensation for his loss of time in looking after the proceedings
and for attorneys fees connected therewith. Both were allowed. However, in
Manley v. State Highway Commission,6 the Commission instituted a condemnation
action and after the assessment of damages they discontinued it. The plaintiff
property holder sued for expenses in defending the action. Relief was denied
because the defendant was a purely public entity, and not liable for torts. As both of
these cases were apparently tort actions, that may be the reason they were not
referred to in the principal case.
If Hamer had gone ahead with his original plans and the Highway Commission
followed theirs it could have been detrimental to both. The state would have had to
pay for any improvement, which in this and many cases could be quite substantial,
and when the highway went through this area it very well could have upset the
design of the subdivision. This points up the need for a system by which land needed
for planned future public use could be limited or frozen in regard to improvements
and yet allow the landowners a beneficial use of their land or provide them some
compensation in lieu of the unrestricted use of their property.
A New York act providing that after the filing of a map of proposed streets no
compensation would be given for any buildings erected should the city later choose
to condemn was held unconstitutional. 7 A later act allowing a city to deny a building
4. Some of the problems in this case are discussed in 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNI-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 32.31, .38, .77 (3d ed. 1950); and 6 NicHOLS, ErMINENT DOMAIN §
26A5 (3d ed. 1953).
5. 124 Mo. App. 271, 101 S.W. 673 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907).
6. 82 S.W.2d 619 (K.C. Ct. App. 1935).
7. Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
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permit was upheld.8 By this act if a landowner not permitted to improve his property
did not get a fair return on his property, provision was made to grant a permit for
a building which would to the least practical extent permit a fair return, and which
would as far as possible hold down the cost should the land later be taken or would
cause as slight a variation as possible in the original plan. The city of Columbia, Mis-
souri has attempted to deal with this type of problem by drawing yard restrictions
from lines established for future widening or opening of streets.0
Perhaps some legislation could be worked out in this field to protect both the
property holder and the public interest in securing needed public improvements at
the lowest necessary cost.
JA Es K. PREWITT
INSURANCE-LIABILITY OF INSURER IN EXCESS
OF POLICY LIMITS FOR FAILURE TO SETTLE-MISSOURI
Comunale v. Traders &_Gen. Ins. Co.'
Plaintiffs were struck and injured by a truck operated by the insured, who
had liability insurance coverage by defendant-insurer. Because insured was driving
a truck which did not belong to him; defendant-insurer denied coverage and refused
to defend the suit-Tiled by plaintiffs. Insured retained counsel and defended the
action. During the trial plaintiffs offered to settle the case within the policy limits,
which offer inusured communicated to defendant-insurer, together with a prediction
that the verdict would'be in excess of the policy limits. Defendant-in~urer refused
the offer to settle and the case proceeded to judgment for plaintiffs far in excess
of the policy limits. Plaintiffs recovered the amount of the policy by direct suit in
an earlier action against the defendant. Having obtained an assignment of all the
insured's rights against defendant-insurer, plaintiffs brought this action to recover
the amount of the judgment in excess of policy limits. The Superior Court of
California in and for the County of Los Angeles entered judgment for defendant-
-insurer, notwithstanding a jury verdict for plaintiffs. On appeal, held, reversed.
The Supreme Court of California held the insurer had a duty to consider the
-insured's interest where it had an opportunity to settle a claim within policy limits,
there being great risk of recovery above policy limits, and the insurer was not
relieved of its obligation to settle because it had wrongfully refused to defend. The
court went on to hold that insured's cause of action for the excess over policy limits
was assignable to plaintiffs.
S. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
9. COLUMBIA, Mo., REV. OaDINAcs, ch. 19, art. II, § 21 (1952), as amended Aug.
19. 1957. and providing in part as follows:
(2) Where an official line has been established for future widening or opening
oi a street upon which a lot abuts, then the depth or width of a yard shall be
measured from such official line to the nearest line of the building.
1. 328 P.2d 198 (CaL 1958).
[Vol. 2,4
17
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1959
RECENT CASES
The liability of the insurer for an excess judgment has been held based on its
bad faith or its negligence in refusing an offer of settlement, with most jurisdictions
stating a requirement of bad faith.2 However, a more important distinction is
whether the insurer may protect its own interest or must also consider the insured's
interest in settlement when there is a conflict of interest.: The degree of protection
which the insurer must give the insured's interest is a point on which there is
much disagreement in the cases. Some jurisdictions which purport to require bad
faith of the insurer before holding it liable for an excess judgment also require
the insurer to give the insured's interest in settlement at least equal consideration
with the insurer's own financial interests.4 Even though this position is fairer to
the insured, it still leaves a difficult fact question as to whether the insurer in
refusing to settle has given the insured's interest equal consideration with its own.5
It has been suggested, in order to remove the uncertainty in this area, a rule should
be adopted which either does not require the insurer to protect the insured's interest
when there is a conflict of interest, or does require the insurer to sacrifice its own
interest for that of the insured.6 The suggestion was never intended as the ideal
solution to this difficult problem, but rather as an aid to legal administration. The
latter suggested rule would probably be preferable as a matter of social policy in
making insurance coverage more certain.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held in Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co. 7 that the
insurer was liable for bad faith in refusing to settle, and declared that the insurer
must sacrifice its own interest to protect that of the insured where there is a conflict
of interest.8 The language of the case is broad and if actually followed may reduce
2. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 171 (1955).
3. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L.
REV. 1136, 1142 (1954). There is a conflict between the interest of the insured and
that of the insurer in each instance where a suit is filed against the insured for
damages substantially in excess of policy limits, and an offer is made to compromise
the suit for a settlement figure equal to, or slightly less than, policy limits. It is to
the advantage of the insured to have the suit settled, whereas the insurer may
desire to take its chances on trying the case, as it will have little more to lose, and
a possibility of having to pay nothing should it obtain a defendant's verdict. For
further explanations of this conflict of interest, see Roos, A Note on the Excess
Problem, [1952] Ins. L.J. 192, reprinted from 26 CAIxF. STATE B.J. 355 (1951); Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
4. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1949);
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957); National Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948).
5. Keeton, supra note 3, at 1145. The determination of this question is generally
made by a jury which has the advantage of knowing the outcome of the trial which
resulted in the judgment in excess of policy limits. It is natural for the jury to decide
that since the insurer decided not to settle, it did not give equal consideration to
the insured's interest. The insurer's problem was recognized in Georg' Cas. Co. v.
Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932), where it was pointea out that as
yet mere mortals haven't been gifted with prophetic powers.
6. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 172 (1955).
7. 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950), 18 Mo. L. REV. 182 (1953).
8. The Missouri court cited Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170
S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E. 346, 348 (1933) which declared: "If . . . [insurer's] own
interests conflicted with those of [insured), it was bound, under its contract of in-
.'nnity, and in good faith, to sacrifice its interests in favor of those of the [insured]."
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litigation in Missouri over liability of the insurer beyond the policy limit. The
insurer will know what it must do-it must settle within the limits of the policy
when it has an opportunity to do so, or refuse settlement at its own risk. If the
insurer is wrong, it must pay the entire judgment. This, of course, will increase
insurance costs as insurers will settle more marginal cases which ordinarily they
would have let go to triaL Nevertheless, if the insured is given more real protection
up to his stated policy limits, some slight increase in premium might be worthwhile
and justified.
In Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l. Ins. Co. of N.Y.0 the Missouri Zumwalt case was
cited as an example of a judicial trend away from earlier decisions such as St. Joseph
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' Indem. Corp.lo which allowed the insurer to
protect its own interest over that, of the insured where there was a conflict. How-
ever, the Oregon opinion stated the holding of Zumwalt to be that the insurer is not
liable unless it is guilty of fraud or bad faith in refusing to settle. The Oregon court
found the real issue in this area to be the amount of protection the insurer must
give the insured's interest, but ignored that part of the Zumwalt opinion which dealt
with that question. Perhaps the language in the Zumwalt case purporting to require
the insurer to sacrifice its own interest for that of the insured is merely dictum.
This appears to have been the opinion of the Oregon court in the Radcliffe case.
The instant California case holds that the insurer must give insured's interest
at least equal consideration with its own. However, it is noteworthy that there
the insurer was not conducting the defense of the action. It was not in control of
the case. Yet, because. insured's counsel communicated offers to the insurer, the
Supreme Court of California held the insurer liable for refusal to settle as though
the insurer were defending. The court thought an insurer should be in no better
position for having wrongfully refused to defend. Proper as it sounds, however,
this result is hard to arrive at in theory, since control of the defense and of settlement
negotiations by the insurer has been the situation in which the insurer's duty to
settle has developed. Modern policies do not require the insurer to settle but merely
give it that right. To overcome this obstacle, the California court relied on an im-
plied covenant of good faith which it found to be a part of every contract, including
one of insurance, that neither party will do anything which would injure the other.
Even though purporting to require only an equal consideration of interests, the
result is similar to the Missouri declaration in the Zumwalt case that the insurer
must sacrifice its interest for that of the insured. This seems to be so mainly because
the question as to whether the insurer breached its covenant of good faith will be
tried by a subsequent jury having the benefit of hindsight. Since the first jury
brought in a verdict in excess of policy limits and the insurer had refused to settle
within the limits of the policy, the jury will find it easy to say that the insurer
In Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D.S.C.
1939), the quoted language was said to be mere dictum.
9. 298 P.2d 1002 (Ore. 1956). This case contains an exhaustive discussion and
citation of the authorities in this area.
P). 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
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should have foreseen the likelihood of an excess verdict and have settled when it
had an opportunity to do so. The probability of the above result occurring in a
trial of the issue of whether insurer breached a covenant of good faith not to injure
insured's interest seems greater than where the second jury trial is simply on the
issue of insurer's good faith alone. Requiring the insurer to live up to an implied
covenant of good faith not to injure the insured seems to be more stringent than
merely requiring it to exercise good faith in giving the insured's interest equal
consideration with its own. It at least comes close to holding that the insurer must
sacrifice its interest for that of the insured where there is a conflict.
The holding in the instant California case that the insured's cause of action
against the insurer for the amount of the judgment exceeding the policy limits may
be assigned to the injured party is probably a desirable one as it allows the real
party in interest to bring the action. There has been no such holding in Missouri,
but a strong argument supporting this position could be made based upon the
California opinion.
In terms of the traditional distinctions in the cases, Missouri holds that an
insurer is liable in excess of the policy limits where it is guilty of bad faith in
refusing an offer of settlement within the policy limits. However, on the more
important question of whose interest must the insurer protect where there is a
conflict of interest, Missouri has language, perhaps dictum, in the Zumwalt case that
the insurer must sacrifice its own interest for that of the insured. Whether our
court should adopt this position, if it has not already done so, is open to much
debate. To do so would be to bring about a substantial change in the insurance
contract, making the insurer liable for every judgment in excess of policy limits
where an offer of settlement within policy limits was refused. As stated above, such
a change may be desirable as a matter of social policy to make insurance coverage
more certain up to the stated policy limits, but it will increase insurance rates. The
decision on this question of social policy is one which the legislature should make.
The whole problem of liability for an excess judgment where a settlement offer
within the policy limits has been refused, with all its uncertainty as it is now
handled, reveals a basic weakness in our system of protection from liability through
limited coverage liability insurance. In the absence of any correction by the legis-
lature, the position suggested in the Zumwalt case might be adopted by the courts
as a partial solution to the problem.
MELVIN E. CARNAHAN
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN MISSOURI-PROBABLE CAUSE-
ACTION ON DEBT PREVIOUSLY DISCHARGED
IN BANKRUPTCY
Standley v. Western Auto Supply Co.'
Plaintiff had purchased several items at defendant's store giving his promissory
note in payment. Two years later plaintiff obtained a discharge in bankruptcy
1. 319 S.W.2d 924 (K.C. Ct App. 1959).
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listing defendant as one of his creditors. Seven weeks later defendant initiated
proceeding against plaintiff for the amount still owed. From the evidence there was
no showing that defendant knew plaintiff had been finally discharged in bank-
ruptcy. Plaintiff set up his discharge in bankruptcy as a defense, and defendant
dismissed his case. Plaintiff then brought an action for malicious prosecution, but at
the end of his evidence the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. On
appeal, held, affirmed.
The decisive question was whether plaintiff had affirmatively shown that
defendant instituted his action without probable cause.2 Probable cause in Missouri
has come to have a fairly settled meaning:
Probable cause for the bringing of a civil proceeding is a belief in the cause
of action or facts alleged, based on sufficient circumstances to reasonably
induce such belief in a person of ordinary prudence so situated as was the
plaintiff who instituted the proceedings.3
And, it is clear that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show lack of probable
cause.
4
In determining probable cause in cases like the principal case, the effect of a
discharge in bankruptcy comes into play. As stated in the leading case of Helms v.
Holmes,5 a discharge in bankruptcy does not extinguish any of the bankrupt's
debts; it is simply a bar to their enforcement by legal proceedings. But, in Gore v.
Gorman's Inc.6 the court on facts similar to those in the principal case, believed that
a discharge in bankruptcy was a complete discharge of the bankrupt's debt and not
simply a bar to enforcement. However, it was apparent that the defendant had
instituted the action for past liabilities knowing that plaintiff had been discharged.
There was also evidence that the defendant had subjected plaintiff to a good deal
of harassment. The court found for the plaintiff.
A similar set of facts was present in Covington v. Robinson.7 The court held
there was no evidence that the defendant continued to prosecute his suit after he
learned of the plaintiff's discharge, and that therefore "no case is made for a charge
2. The Supreme Court of Missouri has hdld that five elements are necessary
to support an action for malicious prosecution: (1) the initiation of the proceedings
by the defendant; (2) the termination of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff;
(3) want of probable cause for the proceedings; (4) malice in initiating the proceed-
ings; (5) resultant damage to the plaintiff. Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897,
903, 198 S.W.2d 861, 866 (1947). The court in the principal case believed that plain-
tiff had clearly proved elements (1), (2), (4) and (5) of his cause of action.
3. Lindsay v. Evans, 174 S.W.2d 390, 396 (St. L. Ct. App. 1943). This definition
has been approved by the supreme court. Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942,
949 (Mo. 1953).
4. "Until there is affirmative proof of want of probable cause the defendant is
not called on for his defense." Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo. 980, 986, 8 S.W.2d 961, 962
(1928).
5. 129 F.2d 263, 266 (4th Cir. 1942).
6. 143 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
7. 242 Ala. 337, 6 So. 2d 421 (1942).
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of malicious prosecution by persisting in the prosecution of a groundless suit to
harass the defendant."s
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in the principal case, observed that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy is only a bar to the enforcement of the bankrupt's debts,
citing the Helms and Covington cases. The court also observed that a discharge in
bankruptcy is an affirmative defense under our statutes.9 Here, as in the Covington
case, there was no direct evidence that the defendant knew of the discharge when
he sued plaintiff. Therefore, the court could have relied on the Covington case and
held that plaintiffs action must fail because he did not sustain the burden of proof
in showing that defendant had knowledge. The court went much further than this
in its holding:
[E]ven though [defendant] knew of the discharge, [defendant could] request
plaintiff to pay, and receiving no reply, file suit on tlfe claim as it did here
and not be guilty of bringing a suit without probable cause, especially when
it dismissed the case a few days after plaintiff first invoked his special
defense, and when it thereafter did not further sue or harass him.10
Gore v. Gormais Inc. was distinguished on the ground that there the defendant had
subjected plaintiff to harassment, while. this fact -vas not present in the principal case.
It seems that the court deemed the absence of harassment as controlling.
TE M. HENSON, JR.
MECHANIC'S LEIN-MISSOURI-APPLICATION OF
CONTRACTOR'S PAYMENTS BY MATERIAL1AN
WHERE SOURCE OF MONEY SHOULD
BE KNOWN
Herrman v. Daffin'
Defendant owner paid his contractor the balance due on the construction cost of
a home. The contractor in turn paid a part of this money to the plaintiff material-
man. The contractor was indebted to the materialman for materials furnished on
jobs prior to the defendant's The materialman applied the payment to the older debts
and then filed suit to forclose a mechanic's lien on the defendant's house.2 When
the owner paid the contractor, he did not specify in any way that his payment was
to be applied by -the contractor to the discharge of any possible mechanic's liens on
the owner's house. When the contractor paid the materialman he did not specify that
8. Id. at 340, 6 So. 2d at 424.
9. § 509.090, RSMo 1949.
10. 319 S.W.2d at 930.
1. 302 S.W.2d 313 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).
2. § 429.010, RSMo 1949, Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47, 10 S.W.
868 (1889) (mechanic's lien is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of property
without due process of law). See Comment, 17 U. KAN. Crry L. REv. 130 (1949) dis-
cussing the history of the statute and suggesting changes.
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the payment was to be credited to the part of his debt representing materials
furnished for the owner's house. The jury found that the payment should have been
so applied by the materialman. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The case was decided on the question of whether or not the plaintiffs had knowl-
edge of the source of the payment made to them by the contractor. It was held that
the plaintiffs had knowledge of facts which should reasonably have caused them to
know or to make inquiry as to the source of the payment. The circumstantial
evidence was held to be of sufficient probative force to warrant such a finding.3
Although there may not have been actual knowledge that it was the defendant's
money with which they had been paid, the court held plaintiffs had possession of
such facts as to cause the "honest, reasonable and prudent man" to make inquiry.4
The court examined the past business relationship between the plaintiff and the
contractor. The contractor had had difficulty in meeting financial obligations to the
plaintiff and to other creditors from the beginning. Plaintiffs maintained individual
ledger sheets for each separate job of the contractor. This enabled them to easily
determine the amount of credit extended on each project. It was also shown that
plaintiffs kept a somewhat close supervision over the actual construction work.
Plaintiffs manager testified that he had visited the contractor and discussed the
question of payment of the account. There was some indication that the manager
knew, at least approximately, the date of completion of the work on defendant's
house and had, therefore, some idea of when payment to the contractor could be
expected. The court found, after a consideration of these facts, that the jury reason-
ably could. have inferred -that the manager had information which should have led
him to inquire. This inquiry would have been relatively easy to accomplish. Failure
to inquire, stated the court, could have justified the jury in assuming that if the
manager did not know, lie refrained from inquiring in order that he would not know.
It may be that the owner will pay the contractor and direct that the contractor
apply that payment to the discharge of any possible mechanic's liens on the owner's
property. Does this instruction to the contractor bind the materialman? The Mis-
souri courts apparently have not dealt with this situation. However, there would
be little justification for holding the materialman bound by such an agreement. If
knowledge, as in the Herrman case, is controlling, the materialman should not be
held to an agreement to which he was not a party and the existence of which he may
not be aware. To hold him to such an agreement would also be contrary to the
obvious intent of the mechanic's lien statute to protect the materialman.
If the owner goes to the materialman directly, and informs him that a payment is
to be made to the contractor and that it is to be used to discharge existing or possible
mechanic-5 liens, then, as will be noted later, the materialman is bound. But if there
is no direction by the owner nor any agreement between the owner and the con-
3. State v. Graves, 144 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. 1940) (en banc); Butler v. City of
University City, 167 S.W.2d 442 (St. L. Ct. App. 1943).
4. 302 S.W.2d at 317.
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tractor or the materialman then the cases are divided as to the materialman's right to
apply a payment as he chooses.5
One view is that the materialman can apply the payment to other debts owed by
the contractor and thereby keep his mechanic's lien. This view follows the general
rule applied to payments by a debtor where no direction has been made as to which
-of several accounts a payment is to be appropriated.6 Where the owner has retained
a sum larger than the total claim of the materialman to insure that the contractor
makes delivery of all items lien free, this theory is strengthened.7 Other courts have
refused to apply this general debtor-creditor rule just noted. Where the party making
the payment to the creditor has received the funds constituting the payment from a
third party whose property will be subject to a lien in the event that the payment is
not applied to the discharge of the debt for materials or lienable items these courts
would zpply the payment to that debt.8 Some of these cases ignore the question of
knowledge of the source of a payment while others make _it the principal issue.9
Where knowledge is a significant consideration, the materialman with knowledge of
the source of the money with which the contractor paid him is required to apply
it to the discharge of the lien on the owner's property.
The Herrman case is .apparently the first Missouri case to be decided on the
question of knowledge or lack of knowledge of the source of the payment to the
materialman. Reference is made in the Herrman decision to the earlier Missouri
appeals case of Campbell Glass & Paint Co. v. Davis-Page Planing Mill.10 The
Campbell case was not decisive of the question involved in the Herrman case since
it did not concern notice or knowledge, although it involved substantially the same
fact situation. In the Campbell case the owner, 0, contracted with P and T to errect
a building for him. P and T in turn, sub-contracted the millwork and glass work to
S. S got his materials from M whom he also owed for previous jobs. While the
work was being performed, S paid M various sums of money but made no direction
as to how he wished it applied to the debts. Subsequently, S went into bankruptcy
while still owing M on the various contracts. M sued to enforce a mechanic's lien on
O's building. 0 contended that because M did not keep a separate account of the
balance due on each project they could not now assert a mechanic's lien against O's
property. 0 contended that M did not know from which job the debt resulted. It was
held that if the dealings of M had been with different contractors that the accounts of
each should have been kept separate.
5. 36 Am. Jun. Mechanic's Liens § 228 (1941); 57 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 249
(1948).
6. T. Dan Kolker, Inc. v. Shure, 209 Md. 290, 121 A.2d 223 (1956).
7. Andrew v. Bishop, 132 Me. 447, 172 Atl. 752 (1934).
8. 36 Am. JUR. Mechanic's Liens § 228 (1941); 57 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 249
(1948).
9. See PhImLips, McHAmc's LIENs § 287 (3d ed. 1893); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1297
(1926), 130 A.L.R. 198 (1941), 166 A.L.R. 643 (1947).
10. 130 Mo. App. 474, 110 S.W. 24 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908). Note that this case is
referred to, erroneously apparently, in 57 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens § 249, at 827 (1948)
as a case where knowledge or lack of knowledge was controlling.
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We do not think, however, where the dealings were with a single contractor,
who had different contracts going on at the same time, that he was bound to
ascertain from what particular contract the contractor realized the money
with which he made payments. No such burden is imposed by the statute.
He was not required to keep an account of the money transactions of his
contractor and the original contractor or owner of the building. He had
no lien on any particular fund.'"
The Campbell case is representative of the general tenor of the Missouri cases
on this problem. There has been a definite tendency to decide according to the
best interests of the materialman. The other Missouri cases on this problem prior to
the Herrman case were not decided on the question of knowledge or notice of the
source of the payment made to the materialman. There are a few general concepts
which seem to be uniformly accepted. For example, the debtor can, where there is
more than one account due, direct that his paymentlbe applied to a certain account. 12
If the debtor does so direct, then the creditor cannot make any change in such
application without the debtor's assent?13 These are merely general rules appliable to
.the ordinary debtor-crelitor relationship. On the other hand the creditor may, where
the debtor did not appropriate a payment, apply it as he wishes.14 Accordingly, the
owner may designate a payment as one to be applied to a specific account for mate-
rials used on his project. Where the owner fails to designate, then the contractor or
the materialman may apply it as he pleases.15 If some items were lienable and others
were not, the materialman is free to apply a payment to the nonlienable items and
retain his lien on the more secure items.16 The materialman may also apply a
payment to the oldest items, as opposed to the most recent.17 In the situation where
neither the owner nor the materialman has indicated any application to a particular
account, the law will act. Here the materialman has enjoyed a definite advantage.
The courts have tended to place themselves in the materialman's position and have
tried to apply payments as the materialman himself would do.' 8 The application has
been to the nonlienable or unsecured items rather than to the items against which
the materialman may assert his lien.19 If the owner failed to specify to the contractor
or materialman how he wanted a payment to be applied, then he stood a good chance
11. 130 Mo. App. at 478, 110 S.W. at 25.
12. Starr v. Mitchell, 361 Mo. 908, 237 S.W.2d 123 (1951); Short v. White, 234
Mo. App. 499, 133 S.W.2d 1039 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939).
13. Bopp v. Wittich, 88 Mo. App. 129 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
14. Reis v. Taylor, 103 S.W.2d 892 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937); Glencoe Lime & Cement
Co. v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 184 S.W. 952 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916).
15. Waterman v. Younger, 49 Mo. 413 (1872); Reis v. Taylor, supra note 14;
Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., supra note 14.
16. Hanenkamp v. Hagedorn, 110 S.W.2d 826 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937); Reis v.
Taylor, supra note 14; Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co.,
supra note 14.
17. St. Louis Sash & Door Works v. Tonkins, 188 Mo. App. 1, 173 S.W. 47 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1915); Wilson-Reheis-Rofes Lumber Co. v. Ware, 158 Mo. App. 179, 133
S.W. 690 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
18. PHmLips, MEcHAmUc'S LxzNs § 287 (3d ed. 1893).
19. Hanenkamp v. Hagedorn, supra note 16.
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of having it applied to another account, rather than to his own, leaving his own
property subject to the lien.
Of course, it can not be forgotten that the mechanic's lien is a statutory creation
enacted for the protection of the materialman. 20 This explains the tendency to favor
the materialman. However, it may be asked if this protection is really necessary or
desirable under current conditions. The Herrman decision recognizes the rights of
both the materialman and of the owner. Prior cases have placed upon the owner the
entire burden of assuring that his property is protected from mechanic's liens. They
have however, given their assistance to the materialman to assure him the added
security of the owner's property. This does not appear to be realistic in view of the
present day large scale operations of both contractor and materialman. In most
instances, the materialan is much better equipped to handle credit problems than
the home owner. The Herrman case does not relieve the owner of all of the responsi-
bility and transfer it to the materialman. It merely requires the materialman to take
notice of facts which should reasonably cause him to know the source of a payment
or to make some sort of inquiry under circumstances where inquiry would be a
normal response. In the absence of facts sufficient to put the materialman on notice,
he is protected. The aim seems to be the prevention of conscious disregard of in-
formation which should call attention to the source of a payment.
It may be wondered where this leaves the owner. What can he now do in order
to feel safe from the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien which he has thought was dis-
charged after he paid the contractor? Obviously, the Herrman case does not provide
adequate protection. Not being a supreme court decision it may not be followed in
the other courts of appeal. The owner, therefore, cannot be sure he is safe even under
circumstances similar to these. The Herrman decision is a step toward the balancing
of rights between owner and materialrnan, but litigation was necessary to obtain that
recognition. The owner can require that the contractor give a bond to indemnify
against mechanic's liens.2 1 This would prevent the litigation which was necessary
in the Herrman case and would seem to be one of the more effective means of
protection. Receipted bills for all materials purchased and used on the project also
afford some measure of security. The owner may also draw his check to the order
of both the contractor and the materialman. It is also possible to obtain a waiver
by the materiahnan of the benefits of the mechanic's lien law.22 It is clear that
the mere payment to the principal contractor and nothing more is what leads to
litigation. Perhaps the best protection is in the careful selection of a reliable con-
tractor. The cases on this problem indicate that controversies have developed more
frequently where the contractor had a history of difficulty in meeting financial
obligations. With an established reputable firm, the possibility of the assertion of a
mechanic's lien by the materialman after the contractor has been paid is c. cainly
reduced.
Wn.LiAm J. ESELY
20. Roy F. Stamm Elec. Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 1178. 171
S.W.2d 580 (1943) (en banc).
21. 36 Ama. Jm. Mechanic's Leins § 212 (1941).
22. Id. § 200.
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Prior to 1903 the Mississippi River at flood stage overflowed its southerly bank
into a marsh on defendant's land. In 1903 a drainage ditch was constructed from
the south side of the marsh through plaintiff's land to a lower point on the river.
In 1908 defendant's predecessor in title constructed a dam across the drainage ditch,
thus creating Weber Lake, which was wholly on defendant's land. The lake was
some eight feet above the normal level of the river, and did not connect with the
river except during the flood stage. Defendant enlarged Weber Lake by excavation
in 1920 and used it for a fishing resort. In 1942 the United States constructed a dam
across the river below Weber Lake. This raised the normal level of the river and
the lake to a common level which was higher than the former level of Weber Lake
and higher than the 1908 dam. After this it was possible to navigate a boat from
Weber Lake to the river by forcing it through intervening shallow water studded
with trees and stumps. Plaintiff, who sought to establish a boat harbor in the old
drainage ditch on his land from which his patrons could navigate across Weber Lake
to the river, sued defendant in equity to compel him to remove a pontoon bridge
which obstructed such navigation. Defendant and his predecessor in title had been
maintaining this or a similar obstruction across the lake since 1908. The trial court
gave a decree for the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. The St. Louis Court of
Appeals held that Weber Lake is not navigable and not subject to a public easement
of navigation. The court based this conclusion on two premises: (1) that Weber
Lake is not navigable in fact in view of its limited and obstructed connection with
the river; (2) that even if presently navigable in fact, Weber Lake is not navigable
in law because it would not be navigable in fact in its natural state, unaided by
artificial excavation and construction.
There has been some confusion as to the English common law test for determin-
ing whether a body of water is navigable in the sense of being subject to a public
right of navigation.2 In this country, the test is whether it is usable for commerce
in its natural state, although there are minor differences as to what constitutes
commerce for this purpose.3 Whether a body of water is usable for commerce, as
1. 307 S.W.2d 681 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
2. American courts have rejected the English common law tide-water test
as unsuited to the conditions of this country. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 233, 238 (1851). However, the true common law test is that ebb and flow
of tide water establishes a presumption of Crown ownership of the beds thereunder.
Malcomson v. O'Dea, 10 H.L. Cas. 593, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155 (1863). Navigability in the
sense of a public highway or passage over the waters is determined by the body
of water's utility to the ordinary modes of public commerce and travel. Griffith v.
Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239, (1900); King v. Montague, 4 B. & C. 598, 107
Eng. Rep. 1183 (K.B. 1825); Grant v. Gordon, 15 Mor. Dic. 12,820 (Ct. Sess. 1781);
HALE, DE JuRE MARIs, in MooRE, HISTORY AND LAW O7 THE FORESHORE 374, 376 (1888).
3. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1940);
The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,
269 S.W.2d 17, 22 (1954) (en bane); Smith v. State, 184 Wash. 58, 50 P.2d 32 (1935).
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that term is locally defined, is a question of fact.4 Its being a marsh and containing
vegetation does not necessarily preclude a determination of navigability.5 Except
in some arid states,0 however, intermittent bodies of water existing only during
periods of flood are not ordinarily deemed navigable. 7 Therefore the court's deter-
mination that the site of Weber Lake was not navigable before the construction of
the dam in 1908 would seem to be sound. Its conclusion that the lake is not, as a
matter of fact, commercially usable at the present time is more questionable.
At least for purposes of congressional regulation under the commerce clause,
a stream may be navigable although some artificial improvements, such as dredging
the channel deeper at shallow spots, are needed to make it commercially usable.8
Subject to the qualification imposed by the commerce clause, if a basin or channel
is artificially constructed by a private person on a site owned by him and not
previously occupied by a body of navigable water, the resulting artificial body of
water, even though in fact usable for commerce, is not subject to rights of navigation
by persons other than the owner of the site unless (1) the public acquires a right
of navigation by dedication, which may be inferred from acquiescence in public
use,9 or (2) particular persons acquire an easement of navigation by prescription.10
As the defendant and his predecessor in title had been careful to exclude all but
their licensees from Weber Lake at all times after its construction, it was clear
that the public had not acquired a right of navigation by dedication or by prescrip-
tion. Consequently, even if Weber Lake is in fact commercially usable at the
present time, the decision would appear to be sound.
DONALD EUGENE CHAwEY
TORTS-MISSOURI-DUTY TO INVITEES-INJURY BY THIRD
PERSON WHEN INVITEE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER
Gregorc v. Londoff Cocktail Lounge'
The plaintiff was shot while a patron in defendant's cocktail lounge. A entered
the lounge after the plaintiff and stood on the other side of the bar, thirty-five feet
4. Elder v. Delcour, supra note 3; Slovensky v. O'Reilly, 233 S.W. 478 (Mo.
1921); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grabner, 206 Mo. App. 96, 219 S.W. 975 (Spr. Ct. App.
1920).
5. Attorney Gen. v. Bay Boom Wild Rice & Fur Co., 172 Wis. 363, 178 N.W.
569 (1920); Ne-pee-nauk Club v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 290, 71 N.W. 661 (1897).
6. Town of Refugio v. Heard, 95 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Orange
Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 562, 126 S.W. 604 (1910).
7. Frazie v. Orleans Dredging Co., 182 Miss. 193, 180 So. 816 (1938); Munson
v. Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1849); Lebanon Lumber Co. v. Leonard,
68 Ore. 147, 136 Pac. 891 (1913).
8. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 3.
9. Stump v. McNairy, 5 Humph. 363 (Tenn. 1844).
10. Saelens v. Pollentier, 7 -Ill. 2d 556, 131 N.E.2d 479 (1956); Kray v. Muggli,
84 Minn. 90, 86 N.W. 882 (1901); Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331
Pa. 241, 200 Atl. 646 (1938).
1. 314 S.W. 2d 704 (Mo. 1958).
1959]
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1959], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss3/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
away, holding a gun against B. A and B quarrelled in this position for fifteen to
twenty minutes, in plain view of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff saw A and B in this
position. The proprietor, defendant, tried to take the gun from A but, being
unsuccessful, he then went into the kitchen and lay down on the floor until the
shooting was over. The defendant did not warn the plaintiff of any danger. A
policeman entered the lounge and stood behind the plaintiff's table. The policeman
commanded A to drop the gun; instead, A fired a shot which injured the plaintiff.
The policeman then subdued A. The trial court instructed the jury that if the
defendant had not warned the plaintiff, the defendant was negligent. The defendant's
motion for a new trial was sustained. On appeal, held, affirmed. The duty owed to
an invitee is to warn him of danger on the premises or to make the premises safe,
but there is no duty to warn an invitee of a danger which is obvious or as well known
to the invitee as to the operator of the premises.
It is well settled that the owner of premises, upon which an invitee comes, is
liable only for his negligence. The duty owed is usually more specifically stated
as a duty to make the premises safe or to warn the invitee of any danger.2 -This
same duty exists when the danger threatened arises from a third person's acts.a'
However, there is no duty to warn an invite of dangerous conditions on the
premises which are "obvious, or as well known"4 to the invitee as to -the occupier of
the premises. 5 This haT been- the: law in Missouri since Welch v. McAllisterG where-
the court suggested that there is a duty to warn only of unusual danger or danger
unknown to the inviteei In Missouri the "basis of the defendant-proprietor's
liability is defendant's superior knowledge's
2. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 45(b) (1950); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 343 (1934).
3. E.g., Sinn v. Farmers' Deposit Say. Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 Atl. 163 (1930);
RESTATEIENT, TORTS § 348 (1934).
4. Ostresh v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 313 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Mo. 1958).
5. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Keltner, 29 Ala. App. 5, 191 So. 633 (1939);
Kessler v. Cudahy Packing Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 607, 102 P.2d 363 (1st Dist. 1940);
Gordon v. Maryland State Fair, Inc., 174 Md. 466, 199 Ati. 519 (1938); Hoyt v.
Woodbury, 200 Mass. 343, 86 N.E. 772 (1909); Caniff v. Blanchard Nay. Co., 66 Mich.
638, 33 N.E. 744 (1887); Vogt v. Wurmb, 318 Mo. 471, 300 S.W. 278 (1927); Dabelstein
v. City of Omaha, 132 Neb. 710, 273 N.W. 43 (1937); Kalinowski v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 17 Wash. 2d 380, 135 P.2d 852 (1943); London Graving Dock Co.
v. Horton, [1951] A.C. 737, 755; cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cox, 51 Ga. App. 880,
181 S.E. 788 (1935); Indermaur v. Dames, [1866] L.R. 1 C.P. 274.
6. 15 Mo. App. 492 (St. L. Ct. App. 1884). The court relied on Carleton v.
Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216 (1868) and Indermaur v. Dames, supra
note 5.
7. But see Stein v. Battenfield Oil & Grease Co., 327 Mo. 804, 39 S.W.2d 345
(1931) and O'Donnell v. Patton, 117 Mo. 13, 22 S.W. 903 (1893). These two cases
speak of this theory of the occupier's duty to invitees, but decide the case on con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk. Therefore, they must have found the
occupier negligent despite the fact that the danger was obvious or known to the
invitee. Compare with the above cases Bartling v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
275 S.W.2d 618 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955) where the court says in effect that there is a
duty to warn but that duty is satisfied by the obvious danger being itself the
necessary warning.
8. Ostresh v. Illinois Terminal RR., supra note 4, at 22; accord, Wattels v. Marre,
303 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1957); Dixon v. General Grocery Co., 293 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. 1956);
20 R.C.L. § 52 (1918).
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Some courts have decided this type of case on a contributory negligence or
assumption of risk doctrine. 9 These courts may find the invitor negligent but deny
liability because of the invitee's contributory negligence or his assumption of the
risk. One Australian court held that the invitation is qualified to the extent of
inviting the invitee to use premises as they appear or are known to the invitee. 10
As concerns dangerous to patrons created by third persons, there are few cases
where the invitor is held to be negligent These dangers usually arise and produce
injury so rapidly that the invitor does not have notice of these dangers until it is
too late to remedy them." However, in the cases where the invitor knows of the
danger created by third persons, or should have known, and where such danger -was
obvious or known to the invitee, there is no duty to warn the invitee.12 The
majority opinion in Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. KeZtner states, 'if such invitee was
unaware of his impending peril, he [invitor] should warn the invitee of the danger,
so that the latter might take steps to avoid injury."1 3 (Emphasis added.)
A Missouri case, where the invitee saw one of the defendant's servants chip off a
hot piece of steel which fell into a box of dynamite and caused an explosion, held that
there was no duty placed on the invitor to warn the invitee of dangers that were
obvious or known to the invitee.14
There seems to be no valid reason for treating dangers created by third persons
differently from other dangers on the premises. That an invitor "is not an insurer of
the safety of his business invitees" and that "there is no duty to warn a business
visitor of a danger or defect which is as obvious and well known to the patron as to
the operator of the business"' 5 are sound principles which rightfully govern the
case where the danger is one created by a third person.
BE NAm N. FANK
9. E.g., Texas Co. v. Washington, B. & A. Elec. R.R., 147 Md. 167, 174, 127
Atl. 752, 755 (1925). The court here states, "There is a confusion of language in
some of the cases .. .but a closer examination shows that, whatever language may
be used, the real underlying principal of the decisions is the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff."
10. South Australian Co. v. Richardson, 20 Commw. L.R. 181, 186, 9 B.R.C. 52,
58 (Austl. 1915).
11. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cox, supra note 5; Hughes v.
Coniglio, 147 Neb. 829, 25 N.W.2d 405 (1946).
12. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Keltner, supra note 5 (plaintiff was grocery
store patron who stood next to manager and saw third person throw rocks at door).
13. Id. at 8, 191 So. at 635. But cf. Moone v. Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649, 65 S.E. 712
(1909) where the court, in upholding the petition against a demurrer, speaks of a
duty placed on the invitor to protect the invitee, hinting at the idea that even if the
patron had been warned, he may not have been required to leave the premises
and forsake that enjoyment impliedly promised by the invitation.
14. Goetz v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 320 Mo. 586, 9 S.W.2d 606 (1928). If
the fact that the third person here was defendant's servant has any effect, as com-
pared to the Gregorc case, it would seem to increase the duty of the defendant.
Yet the court held that there was no duty to warn.
15. 314 S.W.2d at 707.
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MAcPHERSON v. BUICK MOTOR CO. DOCTRINE
Central & So. Truck Lines, Inc. v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc.'
Harry Lasater had his tractor unit repaired at defendant's garage. Subsequently,
Lasater rented the tractor unit to plaintiff truck line. While plaintiff's driver was
using the tractor to pull plaintiff's trailer, the tractor-trailer unit went out of con-
trol and was wrecked because of a defect in the steering mechanism. Alleging that
this defect was caused by defendant's negligent repair, plaintiff recovered a judgment
for the damage to his trailer. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Thus, the question before the court was whether the doctrine of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.2 should be extended to include a defendant whose negligent repair
of an automobile results in the injury of a third person who was not in privity of
contract with the defendant. In the MacPherson case, Mr. Justice Cardozo held that a
defendant automobile manufacturer was liable to the plaintiff automobile owner who
had suffered personal injuries from the collapse of a negligiently constructed wheel
despite the fact that there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendant. Liability of the manufacturer was said to be predicated upon a breach of
duty owned by the manufacturer to the automobile owner:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its
nature gives warning of the- consequences to be expected. If to the element
of danger there is ad-fed knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective- of
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully.8
The MacPherson doctrine is widely accepted in this country4 and is also the rule in
Missouri.5
The MacPherson doctrine has been steadily broadened since its inception. In
Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co.6 defendant repairer rebuilt a truck supplying a
new body, rear axle, and wheels. While the truck, thereafter, was being driven by its
owner, the rear axle broke; a wheel came off and ran upon the sidewalk injuring
plaintiff. The court held for the plaintiff relying upon the MacPherson case. This is
an intermediate case between the MacPherson case and the principal case. In
MacPherson, defendant was clearly a manufacturer; in Kalinowski the defendant
was a rebuilder; in the principal case the defendant is merely a repairer. By a com-
1. 317 S.W2d 841 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
4. For an excellent discussion of this entire subject, see Annot., 164 A.L.R. 569
(1946).
5. Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 296 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956).
6. 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y.S. 657 (4th Dep't 1933).
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parison of the three cases one can trace the development of liability in this area of
the law.
In determining liability in the principal case, the court noted that almost all of
the jurisdictions that follow the MacPherson doctrine have, when the case presented
itself, extended the doctrine to include automobile repairers as well as manufacturers. 7
The court concluded that "we should follow the rule announced in these decisions
which represent the weight of all the current authority. . . . [P]laintiff made a
submissible jury case under tort law principles, and ... privity of contract between
plaintiff and defendant is not a requisite to recovery."8
TED M. HENSON, JR.
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE IN MISSOURI-
APPLICATION OF GENERAL STATUTES
OF LIMITATION
Frazee v. Partney1
This was an action for wrongful death resulting from an automobile accident
which occurred on Missouri Highway Eight about -ten miles west of Potosi on
October 10, 1954. The plaintiff was driving west with his wife and five children.
As the plaintiff approached a curve, a pick-up truck driven by the defendant,
traveling east, came around the curve and into the path of the plaintiff's automobile.
To avoid a head-on collision, the plaintiff, applying his brakes, swerved to the
right, but in doing so caused his car to go down an embankment and turn over
several times killing the plaintiff's wife almost immediately and one of his daughters
later the same day. The defendant saw the plaintiffs automobile pass on his left side
heading for the ditch. He did not stop, however, until he had reached the top of the
hill and seeing nothing he proceeded on. A mile or so further he stopped once more
and he and his wife discussed the possibility of the accident and decided to continue
their trip to St. Louis. The plaintiff, afterward, tried unsuccessfully to locate the
defendant. It was not until 1956 that the defendant was located by the highway
patrol and he readily admitted being at the scene at the stated time. The plaintiff
then instituted the suit for wrongful death contending that the causes of action did
not accrue until suits could be validly commenced and maintained against the actual
defendant and the defendant's violation of § 564A502 prevented plaintiffs from filing
7. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950); Moody v.
Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948); Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co.,
182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938); Zierer v. Daniels, 40 N.J. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377
(App. Div. 1956) .
8. 317 S.W.2d at 846.
1. 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
2. § 564.450, RSMo 1949:
No person operating or driving a vehicle on the highway knowing that an
injury has been caused to a person or damage has been caused to property,
due to the culpability of said operator or driver, or to accident, shall leave
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their suits earlier and excused their delay. The trial court gave judgment for the
defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. The court held that the wrongful death act
created a new and different cause of action not known to the common law; that the
time limit is an inherent part of the cause of action; and, even if the one-year
provision is considered a statute of limitation affecting only the remedy, it is never-
theless a special statute of limitation and must carry its own exception.
Actions for wrongful death have been a comparatively recent development in the
law. The first wrongful death act was enacted by England's Parliament in 1846. 3
In 1855 Missouri enacted our wrongful death statute which was similar to that of
England. In 1905, the Missouri legislature adopted the non-suit section to the death
act.4 Again in 1909, the tolling provision in the general statutes as pertaining to
absence from the state was added to the death act.5 Since then, however, no addi-
tional tolling provisions have been added. The court in the instant case reasoned
that. from the addition of these provisions, the legislature did not intend that the
general tolling provisions or exceptions would apply to the death acts that carried
their own limitations.
From the inception of the wrongful death acts, there has been much discussion in
Missouri cases as to whether the one-year limitation is merely a statute of limitation
or a condition imposed on the right itself and part of the cause of action.6 As early as
1886 the-court1tated-that the latter interpretation should be given.7 Although there
the, -place of said injury, damage or accident without stopping and giving
his name, residence, including city and street number, motor vehicle
number and chauffeur's or registered operator's number, if any, to the
injured party or to a police officer, or if no police officer is in the vicinity,
then to the nearest police station-or judicial officer.
3. Wrongful Death Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
4. Mo. Laws 1905, § 2868, at 137:
Every action instituted by virtue of the preceding sections of this chapter
shall be commenced within one year after the cause of such action shall
accrue: Provided, that if any action shall have been commenced within the
time prescribed in this section, and the plaintiff therein suffer a non-suit,
or, after a verdict for him, the judgment be arrested, or after a judgment for
him, the same be reversed on appeal or error, such plaintiff may commence
a new action, from time to time, within one year after such non-suit suffered
or such judgment arrested or reversed.
5. Mo. Laws 1909, § 2868, at 464:
Every action instituted by virtue of the preceeding sections of this chapter
shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue:
Provided, that if any defendant, whether a resident or non-resident of the
state at the time any such cause of action accrues, shall then or thereafter
be absent or depart from the state, so that personal service cannot be had
upon such defendant in the state in any such action heretofore or hereafter
accruing, the time during which such defendant is so absent from the state
shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the com-
mencement of such action against him....
6. Baysinger v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947); Chandler v.
Chicago & A.R.R., 251 Mo. 592, 158 S.W. 35 (1913); Packard v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R.,
181 Mo. 421, 80 S.W. 951 (1904). Contra, Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 175
S.W.2d 852 (1943); Cytron v. St. Louis Transit Co., 205 Mo. 692, 104 S.W. 109 (1907).
7. Barker v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280 (1886).
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have been decisions to the contrary, it seems to have been established in Baysinger v.
Hanser8 that the limitation is a condition imposed upon the right itself and this view
was accepted by the court in the present case.
This interpretation is followed by the majority of the states which have con-
sidered the problem.9 A contrary view has been taken by a few states which hold
that it is merely a statute of limitation and not merely a limitation upon the right
itself. 10
The court in deciding this case, also discussed the fact that even if it were a
statute of limitation, it was none the less a special statute of limitation incorporated
in the wrongful death acts, hence § 516.30011 would apply and thus limit the use of
the tolling provisions in the general statute of limitations section.
The effect of this interpretation is to defeat the basic purpose of the wrongful
death act and, by unlawful concealment, a wrongdoer is able to defeat the cause of
action which otherwise the representatives were intended to have. In other areas of
the law, unlawful concealment is recognized as tolling the statutory period.
1 2 How-
ever, since no such tolling provision seems to be applicable to the death act, the
wrongdoer escapes civil liability. This may be a possible interpretation of the
statute but it is shocking to the conscience.
However, recent decisions have introduced a new approach to the problem. In
cases where the statute of limitation was considered to be a condition imposed on
the right itself, the court has allowed the plaintiff to plead that the defendant was
estopped from pleading the statutory bar because of misleading conduct on the part
8. 355 Mo. 1042, 1045, 199 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1947). In the decision it was held
that the Missouri's wrongful death statute created a new right and different cause of
action. The time limit in the statute was an inherent part of the cause of action.
9. Gulf States Steel Co. v. Jones, 204 Ala. 48, 85 So. 264 (1920); Earnest v. St.
Louis, M. & S.E.R.R., 87 Ark. 65, 112 S.W. 141 (1908); Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light
Co., 91 Conn. 395, 99 Atl. 1048 (1917); Harwood v. Chicago R.I. & P.R.R., 101 Kan.
215, 171 Pac. 354 (1917); Stasciewicz v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 129 At. 793 (1925); Crosby
v. Boston Elevated Ry., 238 Mass. 564, 131 N.E. 206 (1921); Eldridge v. Philadelphia
R.R., 83 N.J.L. 463, 85 Ati. 179 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912); Martin v. Pitt. Ry., 227 Pa. 18,
75 Ati. 837 (1910).
10. Chiles v. Drake, 2 Ky. (Met.) 146 (Ct. App. 1859); Sharrow v. Inland Lines,
214 N.Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915); Hass v. New York Graduate Medical School &
Hosp., 131 Misc. 395, 226 N.Y. Supp. 617 (Supt. Ct. 1928). An important decision with
respect to the minority is that of Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141 Okla. 1, 283 Pac. 571
(1929). The court decided in overruling a previous decision that the limitations of
the death acts being in the same chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure and each of
the sections being created by the same legislature at the same time are in "parti
materia" and the limitation provided for in the former is applicable to actions pro-
vided for in the latter.
11. § 516.300, RSMo 1949:
The provisions of sections 516.010 to 516.370 shall not extend to any action
which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute; but such action shall be
brought within the time limited by such statute.
12. §§ 516.170-.310, RSMo 1949.
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of the defendant.1 3 In jurisdictions where this argument has not yet been introduced,
it would seem to be to the plaintiff's advantage to do so as the argument seems
quite plausible.
It is otherwise difficult to understand how the unconscionable result in the
instant case and in other jurisdictions could have continued in the law for the length
of time that it has. However, only a few courts have attempted to remedy this harsh
situation. If the courts cannot, within the statute, put an end to the defendant's
circumvention of the social purpose of the statute, it is high time for the legislature
to amend the wrongful death act so that it will achieve its purpose.1 4
JoHN D. RAHOY
TRADE REGULATION-TRADING STAMPS-EFFECTS OF
FAIR TRADE LAWS
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Elm Farm Foods Co.'
Defendants here operated retail markets in Massachusetts and issued trading
.stamps or redeemable cash register receipts with purchases made in their markets.
These stamps and receipts were issued on all items. purchasd. Colgate-Palmolive
Company had minimum price agreements with some retailers in the state on various
items in accord with the fair trade law,2 and while no such agreement was made
with defendant--the-defendants -had knowledge of these other agreements. Colgate
sought to enjoin the defendants from issuing trading stamps or redeemable register
receipts on fair-traded products. The case was reported to the supreme judicial
court by the trial judge 'without opinion and the supreme judicial court enjoined the
defendants from issuing trading stamps or redeemable register receipts on fair-
traded products. The court felt the theory of the fair trade law was to protect the
manufacturer's goodwill and restricting trading stamps on fair-traded items were
reasonably necessary to protect such goodwill. The court moreover emphasized that
13. McLaughlin v. Blake, 136 A.2d 492 (Vt. 1957). Here the court held that
the defendant was estopped in pleading the statute of limitation. Although this was
applied where the defendant made false representations to the plaintiff, the same
reasoning should apply where the defendant's conduct was in unlawfully concealing
himself. Both types of conduct led the plaintiff to believe that suit could not be
brought. Accord, MacKeen v. Kasinskas, 333 Mass. 695, 132 N.E.2d 732 (1956); Frabutt
v. New York, Chi. & St. L. .R., 84 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
14. Until the legislature make-s provision for this situation, it may be worth a
try, in situations similar to the instant case, to file a "John Doe" suit against a
fictitious defendant. This was argued but not discussed as no such suit was in fact
filed.
1. 148 N.E.2d 861 (Mass. 1958). Five companion cases are included in this
decision. The same plaintiff brought actions against Stop and Shop, Inc., Star
Market Co.. Food Center, Inc., Tedeschi's Super Markets, Inc., and Supreme Markets,
Inc.
2. MASS. AN-,;. LAw ch. 93, §§ 14A-D (1958).
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the issuance of the stamps or redeemable register receipts constituted price cutting,
a practice prohibited by the fair trade law.
The problem presented in this case is one of importance in jurisdictions having
fair trade laws. Missouri is one of three states which has no fair trade law, and so
the problem here presented would not arise in Missouri. The technical wording of
the various fair trade laws varies somewhat, but the basic effect of these laws is the
same. They provide that by agreement between manufacturer and retailer the
manufacturer's products will not be sold at retail for less than the agreed price.
Nonsigning retailers with knowledge of such an agreement are bound also. Sale
below this price is deemed an unfair trade practice. With the widespread use of
trading stamps and redeemable register receipts the question presented in the case
under discussion was bound to arise. The Massachusetts holding is a strict applica-
tion of these statutes. The reasoning seems to be that trading stamps or redeemable
register receipts issued with fair-trade goods have a definite and ascertainable value;
this value reduces the agreed upon fair trade price and amounts to an unfair trade
practice. 3 The de minimis principles was considered in a leading case sustaining the
validity of trading stamps,4 but this contention has been rejected in the jurisdictions
prohibiting them. The fair trade law was enacted to prevent price cutting and does
not distinguish between large or small amounts thereof. An argument that a cash
discount was an implied exception to the law was refused. If such exception was to
be made it was felt to be within the province of the legislature, and as they had made
no such exception the court would not imply one.5 It has been argued that trading
stamps or redeemable register receipts are no different from free customer services
such as free parking and delivery. The monetary benefit to the customers from such
services is not denied, but it is distinguished from trading stamps as being remote
from the article purchased while the benefit from trading stamps and redeemable
register receipts is directly and proportionately related to the article purchased and
its price.6
Under a less strict application of the fair trade law the issuance of trading stamps
or redeemable register receipts on fair-traded merchandise has been held not to be
an unfair trade practice. The main reason given is that the issuance of such stamps
or redeemable register receipts is a discount for cash payment which was felt not to
be precluded by the fair trade laws.7 Other reasons include comparing the stamps
and register receipts to the benefit of free parking and free delivery,8 and the
de minimus princple. 9 Where the fact that a retailer operated on a strictly cash
basis was advanced to refute the validity of the cash discount argument it was held
3. Bristol-Myers v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
4. Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros.,'3W6 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
5. Bristol-Myers v. Picker, supra note 3.
6. Ibid.
7. Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n., 322 P.2d 179 (Okla.
1958); Gever v. American Stores, 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956).
8. Ibid.
9. Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., supra note 4.
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that a cash discount was of -greater value to a cash only retailer as his success was
dependent on his ability to attract cash trade.' 0
That the validity of the fair trade acts themselves has been questioned in many
states creates further uncertainty. While a majority of the states which have tested
the fair trade laws have held the valid, a respectable number have held the non-
signer provision unconstitutional."1 Various reasons have been given by the courts
in holding this provision invalid: unlawful delegation of legislative power;' 2 viola-
tion of due process;13 and the need for a reasonable relation to the public need and
welfare which was here not felt to exist.14 The fair trade law itself is still enforceable
against parties to the agreement. In these jurisdictions a special stamp problem will
arise, for where the non-signer provision was held valid an injunction against
issuance of trading stamps or redeemable register receipts on fair-traded items will
prohibit their issuance on all sales of fair-traded merchandise. Logically, however,
where the non-signer provision is void an injunction against the issuance of trading
stamps or redeemable register receipts on fair-trade items would be effective only
against parties to the fair trade agreement and trading stamps or redeemable register
receipts could be issued on large quantities of fair-traded merchandise sold by
non-signers. Thus it would seem that the existence of a fair trade law in such
jurisdictions would be a detriment rather than a benefit to retailers, as parties to
fair trade agreements would be unable to meet competition either on price or the
inducement to sales achieved by the issuance of trading stamps.
Trading stamps have also been subjected to attempts by legislatures to regulate,
tax, or prohiBit their issuance without regard to fair trade laws. The few jurisdictions
10. Food & Grocery Bureau of So. Cal., Inc. v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125
P.2d 3 (1942); cf. Weco Prods. Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d
684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942).
11. Annot., 60 A.L.R2d 420 (1958). The following cases have held the non-signer
provision unconstitutional. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs.,
Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134
Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Eckerd's of Tampa, Inc., 71 So.
2d 156 (Fla. 1954); Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75
S.E.2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 823 (1953); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v.
Shane Co., 143 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. 1957); Quality Oil Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schweg-
mann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956); Argus Cameras, Inc. v.
Hall of Distribs., Inc., 343 Mich. 54, 72 N.W.2d 152 (1955); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis
& Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Skaggs Drug Center v. General
Elec. Co., 63 N.I. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain
Fair., Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 NXE.2d 481 (1958); General Elec. Co. v. Whale, 207
Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99
SE.2d 665 (1957); General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741
(1956).
12. Quality Oil Co. v. El. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 11; Dr. G. H.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., supra note 11.
13. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., supra note 11;
Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 SE.2d 514 (1955); McGraw Elec. Co., v.
Lewis & Smith Drug Co, supra note 11.
14. Union Carbid & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, supra note 11; General Elec.
Co. v. Whale, supra note 11.
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facing this problem have sustained such legislation. Constitutional problems, both
federal and state, are involved in the reasoning for either view and an exposition of
the views is beyond the scope of this Case Note.' 5 However, in Ed Schuster & Co.
v. Steffes 1c it was held that a legislative prohibition on trading stamps issued in
connection with fair-traded merchandise specifically was within the police power of
the state and not void as being discriminatory. This indicates another method of
dealing with the issuance of trading stamps on fair-traded merchandise and a valid
method of limiting their use.
Of important consideration now is the possibility of a federal fair trade law.
Such legislation has been proposed7 and if enacted one wonders what effect it would
have on the issuance of trading stamps. Reasonable argument exists for treating
trading stamps as price cutting; treating them as cash discounts is just as reasonable.
How specific the legislation will be' s and what view the federal courts would take
in the matter are conjectural. Trading stamp companies have made great invest-
ments1  and are becoming more and more a part of the American scene. They
should not be faced with the uncertainty that would arise should a federal fair
trade law be enacted. Such legislation should be reserved to the states as they are in
a superior position to determine whether their economy is in the need of trade
regulation and whether the issuance of trading stamps or redeemable register receipts
should or should not be allowed.
GUSTAV J. Lmm
15. For an exhaustive study of this problem see Annot., 26 A.L.R. 707 (1923),
124 A.L.R. 341 (1940), 133 A.L.R. 1071 (1940).
16. 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737 (1941).
17. Senators Humphrey and Proxmire on May 19, 1958, introduced S. 3850. This
bill in effect makes it lawful for one to establish and control the resale price of
merchandise in interstate commerce identified by trademark or trade name when
such merchandise is in free and open competition with other articles of the same
general class. This bill also contains a non-signer provision making it unlawful for
one with notice of an established resale price to sell below this price. Suits for injunc-
tion may be brought in the federal courts without regard to the amount in dispute.
This bill apparently would apply without regard to local law.
In the House of Representatives bills very similar to this bill have been intro-
duced by Representatives Friedel and Macdonald. Friedel's bill, H.R. 11216, was
introduced on March 6, 1958 and Macdonald's HR. 11264, on March 10, 1958.
For further legislation in this area see H.R. 10527 introduced by Representative
Harris in February, 1958.
18. As indicated above in Ed Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737
(1941) legislation specifically aimed at prohibiting the issuance of trading stamps on
fair-traded merchandise was sustained.
19. The amount of business done by a trading stamp company is pointed out
in State v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 49 N.J. Super. 165, 139 A.2d 463 (Ch. 1958).
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